In the key concluding section to his unpublished ‘Lectures on the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God’ (1919), Collingwood had seemed to follow the Romantics by envisioning a further, post-theistic, development of the religious consciousness. This next stage would see the relinquishment of all forms of ‘idolatry’ (LOP, 96). No longer would religion dogmatically adhere to certain fixed beliefs and practices regarded as expressive of a fully and finally revealed divine Truth. Religion conscious of its own essential historicity and fallibility would be transformed into an ‘infinite process of thought’ (LOP, 96), i.e., a critical, ongoing, open-ended process of inquiry into the nature of the human experience of the transcendent. Here, as elsewhere in his writings, ‘thought’ is not meant in a narrow, intellectualistic sense; it refers to that which is done purposefully or intentionally, or action in the true and proper sense of the term (cf., A, 128). And since, as Alan Donagan once observed, Collingwood never doubted that the mind is a unity and is thus entirely present in all of its activities (RP, 7-11; 154; SM, 37), religious inquiry is necessarily an activity of the whole self, including the practical, emotional, and imaginative functions of mind. This quest or adventure is a never-ending work, ‘an effort without peace’ (LOP, 96).

Although Collingwood would never explicitly repudiate this provocative vision, neither would he subsequently reaffirm or develop it. Why? I wish to argue that the answer to this question is closely bound up with
his equivocation on the matter of religious tolerance. And while Collingwood seems to be primarily pro-tolerance in his earlier writings and anti-tolerance in his later works, I shall also try to show that any early/ later dichotomy would be an oversimplification.

1. Pro-tolerance: The early works

In his earliest published work, Religion and Philosophy (1916; written 1912-14), Collingwood defends the principle of tolerance in the course of rebutting what he terms 'anti-moral theories of religion' (RP, 22). One such view is that religion, as a metaphysical theory only, is indifferent to conduct; the other is that religion has practical consequences - but that they are evil:

Can we look back on all the crimes done in the name of religion, the human sacrifices, the persecutions, the horrors of religious warfare, the corrupt connivance at wickedness, the torture inflicted on simple minds by the fear of hell - tantum religio potuit tradere malum - and still maintain that religion stands for morality? (RP, 22)

Yes, Collingwood answers, because we must distinguish between possessing an aim or ideal on the one hand, and our relative degree of success in achieving our ends on the other. Thus religious adherents do evil not because they are religious (or because religion does not care about what they do) but because they are not religious enough:

Religious persecution may be a crime, but it happens only because the persecutor [mistakenly] believes it to be a duty ... Historically, religion may have been guilty of infinite crimes; but this condemnation is a proof, not a disproof, that their fundamental aim is moral. They represent a continual attempt to conform to the good will of God, and the fact that they err in determining or in obeying that will does not alter the fact that the standard by which they test actions is a moral standard (RP, 22-23).

Tolerance is thus a religious duty while intolerance is based on error or weakness of will; it is a digression from the good and the right, or that which is commanded by God, i.e., the perfectly good will. What God commands is unconditional love, 'the perfection of the religious life' (RP, 32). Given Collingwood's avowed aim to offer a philosophical interpretation of religion in general which will 'agree with the deepest interpretation of the Christian creed' (RP, 148), he is apparently identifying the concept of love adumbrated in Jesus' injunction 'Be ye perfect' - to love even one's enemies (Matt: 5:43-48) - as present, if only implicitly, in all the great world religions.

But what, exactly, does Collingwood mean by 'love'? For it is precisely the principle of a greater 'love' that has historically been invoked in support of holy war, persecution, and attempts at conversion. ("Force", as Lafcadio Hearn once wrote, "the principal instrument of Christian propaganda in the past, is still the force behind our missions"). Physical and mental coercion are said to be motivated and justified by a concern for a higher principle, namely, the individual's eternal character: his or her soul; the soul being infinitely more valuable and important than either the body or the mind (or their pain). If God indeed commands such a love, then one must violate the individual's 'personal liberty' to drag his or her own soul straight to hell. Like Locke before him, however, Collingwood rejected as patently absurd the contention that acts of torture and manipulation really proceed from charity, love, or good-will. But on what grounds?

Love and its relation to tolerance (though not specifically religious tolerance) is in fact discussed by Collingwood in his lecture on 'Ruskin's Philosophy' (1919; published 1922), where tolerance is identified as an intellectual and moral virtue which is the consequence of a 'philosophy' associated with Ruskin and Hegel. By 'philosophy', Collingwood means a core of fundamental principles which systematically informs and guides an individual's activities, and which thereby lends coherence and intelligibility to everything that person thinks and does (RuP, 9-10).

Ruskin's philosophy is 'historicism', which refers, not to historical relativism per se, but rather, to a general 'habit of mind' epitomized by Hegel's treatment of human history as a coherent and intelligible narrative. Historicism is opposed to the abstracting tendency of the scientific or 'logacist' habit of mind, which fragments reality by creating false divisions between things that really are inseparably connected. The logacist sepa-
rates different activities of mind in 'hermetically sealed rooms' (RuP, 33). This analytic-reductive type of thought is contrasted with the synthetic attitude of historicism: the mind that sees the unity of things - the underlying connections and resemblances (RuP, 30; 41). Historicism is thus grounded in 'the belief in the unity or solidarity of the human spirit' (RuP, 17-18).

Mind or spirit must be treated as a whole, with its various activities (art, religion, morality, etc.) grasped as irreducibly distinct, yet inseparably related, expressions of a single ethos or overall pattern (RuP, 18-19). (Like a jigsaw puzzle, each part is unique, having its distinct boundaries and identity; yet each also requires its neighbours to be different in a way which will complement its own peculiar shape and thus serve to complete the picture.) Whereas logicism unifies by excluding, that is, by ignoring or eliminating distinctions between particulars in order to generalize about them (e.g., statistical probabilities), historicism 'supposes[s] that nothing can ever have existed unless it had something to say for itself' (RuP, 15). Historicism unifies by inclusion, for it respects differences by regarding them as indispensably necessary aspects of, and valuable contributions to, the infinitely rich and complex tapestry of (historical) reality.

Hence the logicist is characteristically doctrinaire - an intolerant, fanatical purist - while the 'natural inclination' of the historicist 'is always toward tolerance' (RuP, 14-15), meaning 'the ability to live one's own life and yet to admire and love people who live by the systems which one rejects' (RuP, 21). Ruskin is praised for his 'extreme tolerance' (RuP, 20), or his capacity to feel 'the rightness and value of things which lay outside his own personal system of ideals' (RuP, 20).

Thus 'tolerance' is far stronger than mere grudging acceptance, or what Joseph Campbell terms the 'organic-chemical' sense of 'tolerance': the constitutional capacity of a system to endure a food or drug that to a certain degree or for a certain time can be assimilated even profitably, but beyond that becomes intolerable and is spontaneously expelled. This biological model involves a hierarchical and potentially adversarial relationship of superior versus inferior; the tropism of self-preservation, or organic integrity, embodies a latent tendency towards violence against 'the other'. But for Collingwood, 'tolerance' means full and genuine accept-

ance: a form of love which is inherently incompatible with condescension, fear or hatred of difference, or the use of violence. This love includes admiration, or the aesthetic enjoyment of beholding the beloved - in other words, the disinterested appreciation of beauty; but it also includes sympathy (RuP, 21), which is not at all disinterested. For as Bertrand Russell once noted, genuine sympathy is not to be equated with mere benevolence. To be sympathetic is not merely to wish another well, but to have knowledge of and respect for the other's view of his or her welfare in the process. Thus, if a friend insists on giving me gifts that she herself would like to receive - or would have me prefer - as opposed to what I genuinely want or value, I am apt to feel misunderstood or violated; for either she doesn't care to really get to know me, or else I am being manipulated into altering my desires and preferences. Either way, however, this coercive attention - typical of the intolerant - is not true love.

This tolerance also has an epistemological dimension. Ruskin held 'that in every conflict or dispute there is right on both sides' (RuP, 23), and therefore 'that truth is many sided' (RuP, 22). This is the essence of Hegel's 'dialectical' - and Plato's as well. As Collingwood writes elsewhere (NL 24.57-24.61; 43.15), Plato distinguishes 'dialectic' from 'eristic'. In an eristic discussion, each disputant tries to prove that he is right and that the other is wrong; this is a contest with a winner and a loser, with each side seeking to maintain its fixed views (the logicist approach). But in a dialectical discussion, the aim is to recognize but transcend divisions by penetrating to a deeper level of agreement. Furthermore, the assumption is that dialectic is not merely ethically superior to eristic (as if we must sacrifice truth for love), but that it is indeed a superior guide to truth - just because reality itself is an infinite whole which will inevitably exhaust whatever limited theory our finite minds come up with. So that, as David Bohm has written, we are guaranteed that 'whatever we say the totality is, it isn't - it is also more than we say and different from what we say.' Which is what Collingwood himself had said about historians and history in his 1925 essay 'The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History':

Each historian sees history from his own centre, at an angle of his own: and therefore he sees some problems which no other sees, and sees every problem from a point of view, and therefore under an aspect, peculiar to himself. No one historian, therefore,
can see more than one aspect of the truth; and even an infinity of historians must always leave an infinity of aspects unseen. Historical study is therefore inexhaustible; even the study of a quite small historical field must necessarily take new shape in the hands of every new student. This, we may observe, is not subjective idealism, unless it is subjective idealism to maintain that a hundred people looking at the same tree all see different aspects of it, each seeing something hidden from the rest (NAPH, 54).

Although Collingwood did not take the further step of applying these insights specifically to religion, simply substitute 'religion' for 'history' in the above. A cross-cultural, properly comparative study of religions based on dialectical principles (including tolerance) would reveal that apparently rival faiths, adapted as they are to the specific needs and capacities of their respective adherents, emphasize different aspects of the infinite reality which some call 'God', and thus propound theories which are necessarily incomplete but ultimately complementary. The aim of such an inquiry would be the discovery of significant underlying points of agreement or convergence. Which is not unlike Collingwood's treatment of the problem of rival religions in the 'Lectures on the Ontological Proof', where he declares that 'tolerance is a desirable thing' (LOP, 19) and coincides with 'a very close and sympathetic study' of different religions (LOP, 20). Those who say that they have a particular belief about God often have only a vague and crude idea of what they really mean by this assertion; whereas a deeper understanding of this meaning is almost certain to show 'that two people who disagree are not so much defending one the truth and the other a falsehood, as arguing at cross purposes' (LOP, 20).

Now this is very close indeed to the Eastern (Vedanta) position that the comparativist Ananda K. Coomaraswamy expounded in the West nearly forty years ago:

Religions may and must be many, each being an 'arrangement of God', and stylistically differentiated, inasmuch as the thing known can only be in the knower according to the mode of the knower, and hence as we say in India, 'He takes the forms that are imagined by His worshippers', or as Eckhart expresses it: 'I am the cause that God is God'. And this is why religious beliefs, as much as they have united men, have also divided men against each other.

This subjective determination of religious representations does not, however, entail a facile relativism (as some have supposed). Just because all must be recognized as possessing some truth and value does not necessitate that each must be judged as equally true and valuable; the degree will vary according to the degree to which the principle of inclusiveness is explicitly embraced. Religious forms that are explicitly or implicitly exclusivist will therefore occupy the lower end of the scale. Hence the cardinal error of the religious adherent is to mistake his or her own view of the 'inexhaustible' infinite for the whole truth and nothing but the truth. To the extent that that inexhaustibility is recognized, religion will not merely admit to the ultimately mysterious character of the divine, it will make such a recognition the touchstone of its theory and practice. The dialectical function of controversy would be, not to convert the other, but to show that features which may be dominant in the other's faith as at least recessively present in one's own, and vice-versa.

If Collingwood, like Coomaraswamy, never doubted the necessity of 'applied wisdom' (SM, 15; A, 150-152; NL, 18.13); and if, like Coomaraswamy, he believed that religious tolerance is a moral and religious duty, and is also epistemologically and metaphysically sound; and if, like Coomaraswamy, he connected this possibility with the sympathetic study of other religious traditions; then how did Collingwood wind up in some of his later writings in the philosophies of mind and politics with a parochial-sounding defense of Christian intolerance?
II. ANTI-TOLERANCE: SOME LATER WRITINGS

In *The Principles of Art* (1938), Collingwood argues that every belief not only is accompanied by an 'emotional charge' peculiar to it, but is, in part, the higher-order linguistic expression of that emotion (PA, 266-69). The charge, if strong or 'violent' enough, possesses kinetic power: the capacity to move one to act (PA, 209). In 'Fascism and Nazism' (1940) this power is called 'driving force' or 'punch' (FN, 168; 174). Hence the robustness of the individual's emotional commitment to his or her religious beliefs has practical consequences. In 'Fascism and Nazism,' Collingwood argues that the lack of zealous adherence to Christian doctrine in the modern world is responsible for threatening the demise of western civilization. How is this so?

Apparently following such sociologists as Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown, Collingwood identifies the religious sentiments as the source of communal spirit or sense of solidarity, and thus regards their cultivation as essential for the validation and maintenance of the given social order. Modern European Christianity, in both its Northern Protestant and Mediterranean Catholic versions, is no longer convinced of its own absolute truth, and has therefore been reluctant to eradicate the vestiges of 'pagan' belief and practice. But this had not always been so. Collingwood was doubtless well aware of the historical position of institutional Christianity: *Extra ecclesiam nullus salus* is the doctrine expounded in the papal bull *Unam Sanctum*, issued by Pope Boniface VIII in 1302, and subsequently reaffirmed by the Council of Florence in the Fifteenth Century. That doctrine affirmed that outside the 'One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church' there is 'neither salvation nor remission of sins.' But as Eric Sharpe has pointed out, this exclusivism was not peculiar to Catholicism, and that even in the Europe of the 1660s, this principle was rigidly applied, not only [by Christians] to non-Christian religions, but also to alternative expressions of Christianity. For the Protestant, it was axiomatic that mankind as a whole was fallen, in a state of sin and rebellion, and hence under the condemnation of God; it was held as a matter of theological fact that the heathen in his darkness was doomed, unless he turned in faith to the sole remedy for his sin, the atoning death of Jesus.

Thus, in *The New Leviathan* (1942), Collingwood both describes and commends the medieval Church's virulent persecution of the Cathars, whose gnostic rejection of the visible world as the devil's creation threatened to undermine the authority of existing political and ecclesiastical institutions and render social life impossible (NL 43.1-43.57). The modern failure of Christianity only amplifies the violence of those pagan emotions which are the source of totalitarian political movements that threaten to annihilate the core principle of our (Christian) civilization: respect for individual liberty, which is founded, not on (secular) liberal political theory (as the liberals themselves wish to believe), but rather, on the theological formula that 'God loved the human individual and Christ had died for him' (FN, 171). In the absence of strong Christian faith, the days of free speech and thought – the quintessence of science and democracy – are numbered.

This defense of intolerance is striking; first, because it conflicts with his earlier views; and second, because it must have clashed with his historical expertise. The identification of Christian dogma as the sole or principal source of support for the principles of modern individualism (including freedom of inquiry, conscience, and dissent) is questionable. Collingwood could hardly have been ignorant of Augustine's identification of the human desire for autonomy, or the exercise of personal control over one's own will, as the root of all evil. Having made a significant contribution to historian C.N. Cochrane's *opus Christianity and Classical Culture*, Collingwood must have been aware, not only of the early Church's silence at the Christian state's vigorous persecution of Pagans and Jews, but also of Augustine's own persecution of the Pelagians and Donatists (Constantine having conceded a liberty of conscience to the Donatists subsequently revoked by Augustine). Yet, in a nearly incomprehensible footnote to a passage in *The New Leviathan*, he describes early Christianity as 'a novelty ... a non-persecuting religion' (NL 43.26n) – a situation which he (happily) reports changed only in the Middle Ages. But how did the Medieval Church's treatment of Galileo Galilei
and Giordano Bruno represent an allegiance to intellectual freedom? And what of the one hundred and fifty ‘heretics’ burned at the stake in Calvin’s Geneva, in order (reads the preamble to the ordinances of the Geneva Church) ‘that the doctrine of the Holy Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ shall be preserved in its purity’? 17

Moreover, the view that ‘pagan’ emotions could or should have been extirpated flies in the face of some of Collingwood’s other key tenets. For example, in the conclusion to his unpublished ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’ (1933), he terms self-respect one of the ‘three great rules of life’ (LMP, 129). ‘Self-respect’ – a clear expression of his principle of the unity of the mind – means:

that every desire, every impulse, every feeling which you find in yourself, and therefore in other people, has a right to be there, and demands not to be repressed or hidden away from sight, but to be fitted somehow into the map of life (ibid.).

Such repression inevitably results in what Collingwood would subsequently term ‘the corruption of consciousness’ (PA, 217-20; 282-85); an idea which has obvious affinities with Jung’s concepts of ‘the shadow’ and ‘projection’. 18 This, then, is the process by which we disown certain of our own feelings and experiences (namely, the ones which do not accord with our consciously accepted self-image) and attribute them to others, who become the targets of our feelings of rage and hostility; feelings which are really the disguised fear of the disowned self. The repressed emotions and impulses thus emerge, albeit in morbid forms; while the self-deception of the one thus corrupted renders that individual easy prey to clever manipulators. That is evidently why Collingwood deemed the corruption of consciousness ‘the true radix malorum’ (PA, 285); and it is also why, in the 1933 lectures, he identified anger and fear as passions, or as action breaking down into emotion, and recommended that one never act out of passion (LMP, 129).

Now this suggests a counter-hypothesis to ‘Fascism and Nazism’: Perhaps the rise of European totalitarianism was due to the relative success of Christian intolerance. It is, says Campbell, a ‘natural law of religion’ that gods suppressed become demons; which is to say, that psychological and sociological factors neither assimilated nor recognized by the

consciously controlled system become autonomous, and must ultimately break the approved system apart. 19 On this view, persecution and the threat of it drove ‘pagan’ emotions and beliefs underground, forcing them into unhealthy expressions, and thus creating the situation in which political opportunists could manipulate those who would not, or could not, consciously admit and integrate their true thoughts and feelings. The ‘pagan’ impulse to yield one’s individuality might therefore only reflect a desire to escape the inner turmoil brought about by the conflict between the official and ‘unofficial’ selves. But then who or what, exactly, is this ‘unofficial’ – i.e., pagan – self?

‘Pagan’ literally means country dweller, of which Collingwood himself was one, having been born in the Lake District of Wordsworth, and having continued to live there part-time into his later years. For a time, the Collingwood family resided at Lanehead, situated on Coniston Water, not far from Brantwood, the estate of John Ruskin, whom W. G. Collingwood had served as secretary and biographer. Thus, while Maurice Cowling has lambasted Collingwood for his ‘idiotic commitment to the countryside’, 20 it is impossible to doubt the depth and sincerity of that commitment, stemming as it did from both personal experience and his debt to the Romantics.

That commitment would perhaps find its most passionate expression in ‘Man Goes Mad’ (unpublished; 1936). There Collingwood argues that compulsive violence and war will inevitably result from our loss of a sense of loving union with the land, a deprivation caused by the industrial revolution. Since neolithic times, ours has been a fundamentally agricultural civilization whose health has depended upon the vitality of our reverence – our religious feelings – for the land:

With the origin of agriculture ... [our] emotions learned to focus themselves upon the land itself, the divine mother from whose body we drew [our] nourishment. And this filial worship of the land – not the abstract earth, but [our] own land, the garden that [we] dressed and kept – was not abolished, but only transformed, when [we] learned to think of it not as divine in its own right but as given to us by a God who had made it. That is the point in emotional development which is recorded for us in the first two chapters of Genesis (MGM, 31-32).
But with the advent of factories, railways, and the attitude that nature is an expendable commodity, we are no longer devoted to the land; and so we have become estranged from the proper object of our affections, which are enfeebled as a result. This deprivation of the significance of the land removes the key organizing principle of our psyche, thus eroding our sense of purpose and value. Such loss of meaning effects a general disintegration of mind—the ‘madness’ in question.

But while Collingwood claims that the transition to theism involved only a minor shift in our feelings for nature, he also knew that the peoples who introduced monotheism to the nature-worshipping, agrarian centres of the ancient near-east were herding peoples who did not have a settled relationship to the land—much like the hunter-gatherers of the paleolithic and mesolithic periods. Moreover, when ‘the worship of our land as terra mater, Demeter, our divine mother’ (MGM, 33) became, in theistic eyes, a blasphemous ontological confusion between God and the world, the vitality of our previously intimate feelings towards nature experienced as the mother-goddess could hardly have remained unaffected. The modern scientific disdain for nature as a mere thing to be manipulated (for Russell, the feeling of respect for nature was foolish11) is arguably an expression of this division,22 while our industrial technologies are but a practical application of its coldly utilitarian perspective. The crisis of Western civilization may thus be the result of an intolerant theism’s effort to eradicate nature-worship in its primordial form. Or so Collingwood himself might have argued. Why, then, did he not do so?

III: TOLERANCE AND INTOLERANCE; ANTIREALISM OR RELIGION

Among Collingwood’s unpublished manuscripts is the undated lecture-fragment ‘Religious Intolerance’. As James Connelly has pointed out,23 Collingwood must have written it in February 1919—seven months prior to his delivery of the Ruskin lecture in August 1919, and eleven months prior to his composition of the Lectures on the Ontological Proof in December 1919. Thus, if ‘Man Goes Mad’ side by side with ‘Fascism and Nazism’ reveals an ambivalence about ‘paganism’ in Collingwood’s later thought, then ‘Religious Intolerance’ in conjunction with the other lectures from 1919 suggests that he was of two minds regarding tolerance fairly early on.

‘For a century or more,’ he writes, ‘religious toleration has generally been held a duty’ (RIn, 1). Persecution historically assumed three forms: (i) physical (holy war, torture, etc.); (ii) social-political (disenfranchisement, etc.); and (iii) the attempt to convert others via exhortation and reasoning. The three stages of toleration are ‘intimately connected’ (Rln, 1). The Enlightenment ended the first form of persecution, while J. S. Mill in On Liberty was still faced with the second:

The ideal which he there maintained was freedom of speech and of the press; the doctrine that argument should be the only weapon of controversy, and that society should reject everything like the penalization of opinion as definitely as it had rejected the act of faith (Rln, 2).

Mill’s victory paved the way for Oscar Wilde, who only half in jest observed that since argument itself is a form of coercion (and by this he meant genuine argument and not merely exhortation disguised as argument) we should not argue with each other, either. This view, which Collingwood regards as a ‘reasonable corollary’ (Rln, 3) of Mill’s position, is now dominant:

Argument has gone out of fashion, largely because we think it impolite; and philosophers justify the new fashion by maintaining that we hold our beliefs not because they are logical but because they serve our private ends. The result, as I see it, is a kind of orgy of religious toleration. We are willing to tolerate anything and everything except intolerance; and we tolerate in the fullest sense of the word: we refrain from criticizing and even from openly disagreeing (Rln, 3).

Collingwood’s point is not merely that people refrain from arguing with each other on ethical grounds, but that they cannot even formulate an argument to themselves; for they no longer possess the concept of giving reasons for their beliefs. Rational justification has been replaced by psychological explanation, truth by utility. Yet, there is a deeper reason for this ‘utilitarian turn’:
We become tolerant when we begin to doubt whether our own opinion is the only reasonable one; we are confirmed in it when we begin to believe that all opinions are but guesses at the truth; and toleration becomes a cardinal virtue when we adopt the pragmatic notion that opinions are like diet – one man’s meat is another man’s poison’ (Rln, 3).

In other words, the true origin of tolerance is religious doubt. It follows that ‘tolerance would appear a mark of irreligion – a mark of unbelief or of belief feebly and timidly held – rather than a religious duty’ (Ibid.). Accordingly:

If you have enough religion to believe anything fervently, and to believe that your intellectual and moral salvation depend upon your believing just that, you cannot achieve the complete toler- ance of an Oscar Wilde whose very ideal is to avoid an excess of zeal ... Intolerance, in one sense or another, is the driving force behind any belief; and we only advocate tolerance when we think it undesirable that a belief should have driving force behind it (Rln, 4).

The absence of such ‘driving force’ (the phrase will, of course, resurface in ‘Fascism and Nazism’) is thus indicative, not of the anguished unbelief of the atheist who has struggled mightily with religious questions, but rather, of the apathy of what Alasdair MacIntyre has termed the secularized unbeliever, who sees no point in actually denying the existence of God because he never saw any point in affirming it in the first place. Which precisely fits Mill’s own description of himself as ‘one who has, not thrown off religious belief, but never had it.’

But while it may be accurate to attribute the historical rise of tolerance in Europe to a gradual withering of belief (or, as R. H. Tawney has suggested, that toleration simply made good business sense in the new economic environment of free markets), this is not universally the case. As Coomaraswamy noted, religious tolerance in Asia has been founded, not on the negative dismissal of all religious beliefs as false or irrelevant, but on the positive conviction that all religions are in some sense true. And Collingwood himself had earlier professed a similar belief in a sound intellectual basis for a willing tolerance. What, then, had happened?

It is, I believe, Speculum Mentis (1924) which holds the answer. Here Collingwood argues that ‘religion’ is at least implicitly but necessarily wedded to a rather naive philosophical realism. The religious adherent experiences God through the various acts of devotion as distinct person, having his own, absolutely separate, existence apart from those acts. Interpreting this revelatory experience, the worshipper characteristically regards his or her set of beliefs about or ‘theory’ of God as a literally true representation of this external reality; so that God is thought to be, in himself and independently of the act of apprehending him, what the worshipper apprehends him as being (cf., EM, 34). The religious adherent is unshakably convinced that this act is a pure receptivity to which he or she makes no essential epistemological contribution. And the belief that God simply reveals himself to the worshipper has great psychological power and social utility. For the eristic mode of discussion which naturally and inevitably flows from this conviction is, as we have seen, essentially contentious in its character. For this reason, it unifies the community of adherents by identifying their particular beliefs and ideals as absolute truths and values, and hence, the incompatible beliefs and ideals of outsiders as totally erroneous and worthless.

However, from the higher standpoint of philosophical reflection, this realism is untenable (SM, 252-260; 288). To the extent that ‘religion’ itself becomes consciously aware of this, it will become tolerant and dialectical in its mode of discussion. Unfortunately, this recognition is ultimately self-destructive: religion is no longer taken seriously, even by itself. Hence the two alternatives are, dogmatism or death; religion or tolerance. Either religion remains resistant to critical reflection and thus fixed in its erroneous beliefs and self-ignorance (dогматик), or it becomes conscious of itself and thereby loses its unique identity and sociological power. But if the very phrase ‘tolerant religion’ is a contradicatio ad unum, there is no possibility of the creative transformation of the religious consciousness such as Collingwood had previously envisioned.

Collingwood’s discussion of tolerance occurs in his examination of the relationship between ‘Art’ and ‘Religion’, the first and second forms of
experience. Although 'Religion' is the historical successor to 'Art', the former is inevitably intolerant while the latter is just as inevitably tolerant. Why is this? Art does not care that its object is 'real', only that what it beholds is 'beautiful'. 'Beauty' means that its object can be imagined as a whole, in which the relationship of part to part and part to whole is utterly harmonious: nothing is either superfluous or missing. The response to beholding beauty is rapture (SM, 120). The 'artist', i.e., anyone regarding any object from an aesthetic standpoint, is thus quintessentially self-absorbed or solipsistic.

The world of imagination is a private world, a world solely inhabited by its author. The artist, in the moment of aesthetic creation and enjoyment, knows nothing either of a real world, whether natural or artificial, or of minds other than his own (SM, 68).

Borrowing from Leibniz, Collingwood terms this indifference the 'monadism' of 'Art':

Works of art always ignore one another and begin each from the beginning; they are windowless monads; and this is because they are acts of imagination, from which it follows that they are careless of mutual consistency and interested only in their internal coherence (SM, 71).

From its own internal, pre-philosophical, perspective, then, 'Art' neither asserts nor denies, but envisions itself as pure supposal, each act of imagination emerging a fresh and neither determined nor constrained by anything external to it – including imaginary acts previously performed by the same consciousness, or by the imaginary acts of other 'artists'. So 'Art' would not care whether such a person as Scrooge really existed, or whether Alister Sim's Scrooge is faithful to the Dickens character. And because 'Art' does not make such comparisons, is not interested in judging true representation from false, in discriminating fact from fancy, it is not judgmental in the moral sense: it does not condemn or 'discriminate', or seek to exclude that which is different. 'Art' is sublimely indifferent to shared or objective reality: 'Pure fancy is monadic, tolerant; it cares for nothing beside its momentary object, and does not even trou-

ble to find out whether anything incompatible with this object is being fancied elsewhere' (SM, 114).

Of course, as Collingwood notes, nothing can be purely imaginary; even the most outlandish fantasy must find its raw materials in the realm of fact, however they are used or distorted (SM, 79). If and when 'Art' realizes this, it passes over into 'Religion', which is essentially an experience of worship in which 'we' (worshippers) believe 'that we here come face to face with something other than ourselves and our imaginings, something infinitely real, the ground and source of our own being,' (SM, 120), namely God, before whom one necessarily feels bound to fall down in adoration (SM, 119). The aesthetic indifference to fact and shared, objective reality thus gives way to the assertion of the absolute reality of the religious object: the ens realissimum. The moral aspect of the experience of God's holiness is the worshipper's feeling of inferiority, the conviction of sin: that sense of estrangement from the divine which is a key element of 'Religion' (SM, 141).

Thus, it is not merely the experience of worship, but also the religious interpretation of that experience that defines 'Religion'. And as belief becomes the touchstone of the religious attitude, the tolerance of 'Art' is left behind. For the logical relation between a proposition and its contradictory requires that the truth of the one necessarily implies the falsity of the other:

Pure fancy is monadic, tolerant ... But assertion is the transcending of this monadism, for to make any given assertion is to commit oneself to the denial of whatever contradicts it. Now religion is essentially assertion, belief. To believe this is to deny that. Therefore religion by its very nature is pledged to selectiveness, to a discrimination between the utterances of the spirit, to a dualism between true vision and false vision (SM, 114-15).

'Religion' by nature is not solipsistic and tolerant but social and intolerant. This exclusivism is a consequence of the implicit philosophical realism of 'Religion' – its belief that it is worshipping the One True God Who Really Exists. 'Religion' must deny all those different and mutually incompatible metaphysical accounts, and reject as infidel all those alternative pieties:
But the sociability of religion is part of its fundamental nature ... because religion achieves an explicit logical structure. It is an assertion ... Now assertion or the logical function of the mind is the recognition of reality as such, and reality is that which is real for all minds ... for each asserts what he believes to be not his own but common property, objective reality. And even when their assertions are different, they are not merely different, like different works of art, but contradictory; and contradiction, even in its extreme forms of persecution and war, is a function of sociability. It is the explicitly rational character of religion that necessitates religious controversy and persecution, for these are only correlates of its cosmological and social nature. To deprecate them and ask religion to refrain from them is to demand that it shall cease to be religion (SM, 115-16).

The disinterested admiration which is the hallmark of the aesthetic attitude is thus radically transmuted: In 'Religion' one is no longer a mere spectator of something but an active participant in a reciprocal relationship with someone; one must decide whether to be for God or against him. The auto da fé is but a corollary of religion's social and cosmological nature, i.e., of its realism. This is an internal rationality, in the sense that behaviour is flowing intelligibly from belief.

From the standpoint of philosophical reflection, however, the claim of 'Religion' to have completely dissociated itself from imagination or 'Art' is clearly false: 'God is regarded as not our own invention, not a fancy or work of art, but a reality, indeed the only and ultimate reality' (SM, 120). But the primary form in which all religious assertions are embedded is the story: myths and the rituals which re-enact the myths. Now the language of myth is the symbolic image or metaphor, e.g., God as our 'Heavenly Father'. But 'God isn't really your heavenly father, because he isn't literally your father and he isn't literally in the sky' (SM, 124). Yet, the religious mind inevitably lapses into a literal reading of the symbol, and takes its imagery for a fact: 'The distinction between what we say and what we mean, between a symbol or word and its meaning ... is a distinction hidden from religion itself' (SM, 125). 'Religion' conceals this from itself because if these representations were explicitly recognized to be symbolic they would be recognized to be exchangeable with others (SM, 126). But this would destroy the basis of the cult, which must have something distinctive to affirm, a specific god to worship. Thus, the symbol, confused with that to which it refers, itself acquires a sacred character, becoming 'infinitely precious' (SM, 127) - the very idolatry Collingwood had hoped would be transcended in the next stage of religious evolution.

This is why the mystic who realizes that the symbol is but a symbol and must be left behind (as, for example, Meister Eckhart does when he declares that 'Man's last and highest parting occurs when, for God's sake, he takes leave of God') represents the crown of religion and its deadliest enemy; the great mystics are at once saints and heresiarchs (SM, 127). For the mystic, there is, finally, no radical ontological separation between God and the world. And if you 'really do find God everywhere' (SM, 127), then you don't have to go to any special place, or use only certain formulas, in order to reach the divine. While the theologian who views some religious symbols as wholly metaphorical or all as partly metaphorical - and thereby turns the God of revelation into a metaphysical concept - offers but a halfway house to 'Science' ('logicism', in essence), which is explicitly concerned with the abstract classificatory concept, and for which only the repeatable, the typical, the average - that is, the quantifiable - is real; and here one symbol is as good as another. To the extent, then, that 'Religion' consciously accepts the figurative nature of its own discourse, that discourse loses its meaning (its unique significance, value, and purpose).

That is, it would be suicidal for the religious mind to admit that its knowledge of the perfect reality is itself radically imperfect. Such an admission would follow both from an appreciation of the key role played by the creative imagination in producing all religious forms - admitting that the God we have is the one we are capable of imagining - and also from the recognition that the encounter with God in the experience of worship does not involve a pure and simple receptivity, or sheer 'apprehension', utterly innocent of the epistemic contributions of particular human minds. As Locke observed, 'the testimony ... of God himself ... carries with it an assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. Only we must be sure that it be a divine revelation and that we understand it right.' In deciding whether it is God or the Devil who speaks, and what is being said, the adherent's use of his or her own rea-
son in the form of critical interpretive judgment is unavoidable; this use being determined by his or her presuppositions and particular – hence necessarily limited – point of view. As Collingwood himself had noted in his discussion of history.

Since partiality and fallibility necessarily imply imperfection, ‘Religion’ has good reason to cling to its naïve idealism. But what must be abandoned is the view that God, the Absolute Other, is pure agent, while humans are mere patients or instruments of the divine will, i.e., mere receptacles (and not creators or shapers) of meaning and truth. Realism in general and as such must be eschewed: ‘all knowledge considered as knowledge of an objective reality independent of the knowing mind ... [is] an illusion’ (SM, 238). Knowledge as the apprehension of an object existing wholly apart from and unconditioned by the subject is a self-frustrating error which only leads to skepticism: ‘Realism itself is as old as thought, being in fact identical with ... error in general’ (SM, 281). Hence the most basic philosophical definition of religion is that it is a form of consciousness which ‘believe[s] in the reality of the figments of its own imagination’ (SM, 111).

Although Collingwood regards Christianity as the highest form of ‘Religion’ (SM, 139), even at its most basic or generic level of definition, ‘Religion’ is virtually indistinguishable from theism in general and Christianity in particular – as Jung’s gloss on the Christian view illustrates:

For [the Christian] man is small inside, he is next to nothing; moreover, as Kierkegaard says, ‘before God man is always wrong.’ By fear, repentance, promises, submission, self-abasement, good deeds, and praise he propitiates the great power, which is not himself but totalliter aliter, the Wholly Other, altogether perfect and ‘outside,’ the only reality.\[25\]

Furthermore, as Walter Kaufmann has observed, the Christian preoccupation with dogma is a direct consequence of St. Paul’s innovation in making the profession of certain specific beliefs the ‘gate to salvation,’\[32\] i.e., the necessary and sufficient condition for achieving redemption.

And this would explain why ‘Religion’ is so centrally focused on assertion and denial, and on its own sense of being the sole custodian of unique metaphysical truths.

Collingwood’s devotional or dualistic conception of ‘Religion’ in fact cuts out a great deal. As he himself recognized, it excludes any mystic who speaks of a natural, consubstantial union or identity of the soul with the divine. It excludes a non-theistic religion like Zen Buddhism, which views dogmatic attachment to one’s beliefs as a key source of human suffering: a symptom of ignorant craving, or attachment to ego, which only serves as an obstacle to enlightenment.\[35\] Also left out is the non-exclusivist, syncretistic approach of the religions of late antiquity, in which a deity such as Aphrodite would be compared, and even equated, with Astarte of Babylon or Isis of Egypt.\[34\] Of course, the nondual formulation of the Chandogya Upanishad, ‘Thou art That’ (tatt svam asi), according to which, Atman is equated with Brahman, is likewise out; as is the notion of the absolute ubiquity of the divine principle affirmed in the Buddhist text, the Vijnacchedika (The Diamond Cutter), which declares that ‘All things are Buddha-things.’

Hence the notion that religion as such and in general is necessarily wedded to a naive and rigidly dualistic realism is simply inaccurate. Take, for example, the Tantric Buddhism of Tibet. We read in his autobiography that the Dalai Lama regularly consults oracles and addresses prayers to various nature-spirits; but immediately upon mentioning these activities, he issues a caveat to the reader: ‘This should not be taken to imply belief in the existence of external, independent entities, however.’\[35\] Is he, then, merely contradicting himself? How could one address deities or spirits that are not thought of as really existing? Beyond the psychological point is the logical one: Don’t we mean by ‘deity’ or ‘spirit’ a non-mortal person who possesses an irreducibly distinct identity?

Perhaps this depends on who ‘we’ are. For the Tibetans, deities are typically viewed as symbols, either of primary cosmic forces, like wisdom and compassion, which are direct expressions of the absolute divine reality in its unknowable and unsayable aspect (the Void), or of the peculiar psychological forces locally at work in the individual adept.\[37\] One technique for bringing these psychic forces into harmony with their cosmic counterparts makes use of what is called the Yidam, which is a deity...
adopted by the adept as his or her mentor and guardian. On the advice of the guru, the adept will choose an image — that of an established deity, of the guru himself/herself, or even one created by the guru — that is especially suited to the individual’s own level of psycho-spiritual development and to the nature of the challenges that must be faced. The Yidam, in essence, functions as an aid to meditation — a visualization tool. The Sanskrit term for such a device is yantra, which signifies a machine, e.g., a dam or other device, constructed to harness energy in accord with human purposes. Thus, while the deity is experienced as a reality distinct from the ego — and it could not have psychological power otherwise — it is also known, at another level, as a human-made instrument, the function of which is to put the adept in touch with forces that are conceived of, not as absolutely other, but as located in the deepest recesses of his or her own being, which is ultimately identical with the ground of being of the world.

If a religion possessing an epistemologically sophisticated, non-realistic conception of divinity actually exists, then — following the logic of Collingwood’s own argument — a tolerant religion cannot be impossible. One of the Dalai Lama’s persistent themes is indeed the unity of all religions in intending compassion and mercy, and the concomitant importance of tolerance from both an ethical and religious perspective. But does this mean that Collingwood’s failure to notice the relevance of other religions to his argument was merely the accidental result of adhering to an unduly restrictive definition of religion? Is it merely that he did not have enough empirical knowledge of other religions? As Donagan has observed, Collingwood did not closely study any religion apart from Christianity. But even if there is some truth in this, I do not think it is the full story; the complete answer lies in his attitude to Kant.

Here it is important to note that what is common to all of these non-dualist perspectives is the idea of the ineffability of the absolute: that what lies beyond the primordial abstractions of subject and object, namely, the unifying principle of the world, cannot be grasped by means of any secondary abstractions (concepts, names, or images), all of which directly or indirectly proceed from the initial dichotomy of self and other. Hence the ultimate truth must elude all conceptualization and linguistic formulation. The absolute is real, and yet it cannot be said to

exist, either in the sense that an organic entity is said to be alive, or in the sense that any object takes up space and endures through time. And this, of course, is the reason for, and sense of, the pregnant, articulate silence of the mystic; for the mystic knows that the forms of imagination and thought do not literally represent the ultimate, but can only point in its direction. As Coomaraswamy says, the symbol invites us to an experience:

the concept is of value not as a thing in itself, but as dispositive to an essential vision, not in any likeness. The beauty of the formula, the verbal or visual icon, poignant as it may be in Christian gospel or Vedic liturgy, is not an end in itself but, referred to him who uses it, an invitation.

While certainly not a naïve realism in the sense of holding that in a purely transparent act of apprehension we come to know that which exists independently of us exactly as it exists in that independence, this view is philosophically akin to a ‘problematic’ realism, according to which, in the words of John Finlay, ‘something exists, and must be thought of as existing, even though we can know nothing about it, and need not have been thinking of it.’ This, of course, is Kant, for whom there is a permanent and necessary distinction to be made between reality-as-it-is-for-us and reality-as-it-is-in-itself, and thus that behind all appearances lies something inexpressible; that which is transcendental of our sense-experience and conceptual knowledge. But for Collingwood, ‘the thing in itself, the thing defined as out of all relation to the knower of it, [is] not only unknown but unknowable, not only unknowable but non-existent’ (LHK, 99). This nothingness is not the no-thing of the Buddhists — the void of sunyaata, the void that is no void but a pleroma, a fullness — from which all possibilities emerge — but rather, the purely negative emptiness of annihilation; the end, as Sartre says, of all possibility; the nihil of nihilism. That is to say, it is not merely that Collingwood equates our inability to settle ultimate questions intellectually with scepticism (RuP, 26), but that he dismisses what cannot be said or intellectually grasped as merely unreal. And here Collingwood’s move anticipates subsequent developments in the tradition of analytic philosophy, which has tended to interpret Wittgenstein’s statement in the Tractatus that the
limits of his language are the limits of his world as expressive of a thesis tantamount to 'linguistic idealism or lingua-ism, which makes all reality linguistic.'

Collingwood's anti-Kantianism also explains an otherwise puzzling lacuna in his account of religious symbolism in *Speculum Mentis*. For despite his own attention to historical particularity, he constantly speaks of the symbol — as if the fundamental nature of all symbols, including religious and scientific symbols, is in essence the same: 'Lose the symbol, and in religion you lose the meaning as well, whereas in science you merely take another symbol, which will serve your purpose equally' (SM, 125). For example, if tomorrow mathematicians decreed that henceforth the operation of addition would be represented by the '+' sign instead of the '#' sign, addition itself would not be affected in the least. Similarly, if religion were to become consciously aware of its symbolic images as such, it, too, could inter-change symbols. But this would deprive the particular symbol of its special value, its 'numinous' character; and the community would lose its essential identity, which depends on its retaining its illusion of exclusivity. This is the death of true religion, even if it signals the rebirth of that tolerance that had been set aside with the move from 'Art' to 'Religion'. But are all symbols in fact functionally and genetically identical?

As the anthropologist John Layard has noted, however, religious symbols typically are not arbitrarily manufactured or selected in this way, but rather, are either spontaneous productions of the hidden regions of the mind, or else (if they pre-exist from the standpoint of a given individual) are nonetheless attracted by the 'specific gravity' of those very regions:

Now it is a truism that no [religious] symbol has ever been invented; that is to say that no one has ever successfully 'thought out' a symbol and used it to express a truth. Such artificial efforts are doomed to failure, and never succeed in drawing to themselves the power of real symbols ... [which] leap to mind without conscious effort.

Layard is of course referring to a basic distinction drawn by Jung between a 'sign' and a 'symbol': A 'sign' is an inherently meaningless representa-

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tion which acquires a conventionally recognized meaning through common use or decree; and it always refers to things and their relations. Whereas a 'symbol', though capable of being consciously employed, is initially produced in a spontaneous fashion in dreams and visions, and refers past all things to the mysterious ground which underlies them; it participates in and refers to the transcendent. A 'symbol', Jung says, necessarily implies something vague, unknown, or hidden from us ... a word or image is symbolic when it implies something more than its obvious and immediate meaning. It has a wider 'unconscious' aspect that is never precisely defined or fully explained. No one can hope to define or explain it.

In Jung's view, then, a 'symbol' is deprived of its true function and power when it is either naively concretized by the imagination (God as the bearded King enthroned in the sky), or overly clarified by the intellect ('God' is nothing but a metaphor for the ideal of human perfection); either way, the symbol encloses the mind within, rather than serves to transport it beyond, the quotidian. On this view, the true power of the symbol is a function of its not being literally interpreted; and it is also a function of respecting those particular symbols which have, somehow, chosen us through their spontaneous psychological eruption or their intuitive appeal. Thus, a symbol gains rather than loses in significance when it is figuratively rendered. And this means that it should be possible to recognize correspondences between one's own and other symbologies without thereby depriving one's own symbol-system of its psychological power; and that tolerance, or the dialectical mode of discussion, is not incompatible with self-awareness on the part of the religious consciousness.

If Collingwood was too hasty in concluding that genuine religiosity is incompatible with a proper grasp of religious discourse, to affirm the reality and significance of what, pace Jung, can never be precisely defined or fully explained, smacks of the very Kantianism which Collingwood abjured. Hence he could not have accepted Jung's distinction. Every cult is therefore simply stuck with its own, (only) apparently unique, symbology. Thus Collingwood also appears to have anticipated subsequent
developments in the philosophy of religion based on certain interpretations of the later Wittgenstein, namely, those views which emphasize the absolute idiosyncrasy and autonomy of 'language-games' or 'forms of life'. The religious forms of language are envisioned as radically different from, and incommensurable with, e.g., the scientific and the philosophical forms; and each distinctive religious tradition is, in turn, a virtual island of discourse.

This separatism seems to have been forecast in 'The Philosophy of the Christian Religion' (unpublished; 1920). There Collingwood defends the establishment of an endowed chair of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at Oxford by attacking such disciplines as comparative religion and the philosophy of religion, arguing that they are based on the vague, empty, unhistorical abstraction of 'religion-in-general'. To compare, say, Quakerism with Buddhism is 'unreal and unprofitable,' whereas it is both useful and necessary to give an account of the historical development of Quakerism from its sources in Renaissance and Medieval Christianity (PCR, 11). The implication seems to be that key differences in language and culture preclude a genuine communication between, and understanding of, other religious traditions.

But nothing could be further from the spirit of Collingwood's own initial allegiance to the principle of the indivisibility of the human mind or spirit. To the extent that such differences only serve to separate us, as opposed to carrying our attention past such divisions with suggestions and implications of a deeper underlying unity, the whole is fragmented; there is no such thing as a common humanity, a single human history (the historicist innovation); there is merely the history of this and that isolated group.

And yet, Collingwood's rejection of the Kantian position may not have been a strictly philosophical matter. If indeed, as we have already noted, positive belief is the 'gate to salvation' in the Christian view, then the via negativa cannot have the final metaphysical say; one must be able to claim to be describing God as he really is, in himself, and not merely as he is for us. It is thus instructive to follow Kaufmann's suggestion and turn to Fr. Frederick Copleston's account of the relationship between Moses Maimonides and St. Thomas Aquinas:

Maimonides ... was more insistent than [Aquinas] on the inapplicability of positive predicates to God ... [T]he God is not, rather than what He is. He is one and transcendent ... but we cannot form any adequate positive idea of God. St. Thomas, of course, would admit this, but Maimonides was rather more insistent on the via negativa. And so he would have to be: 'Scripture,' says Luther, 'makes the straightforward affirmation that the Trinity, the Incarnation and the unpardonable sin are fables.' And: 'The Holy Spirit is no Sceptic, and the things He has written in our hearts are not doubts or opinions, but assertions - surer and more certain than sense and life itself.' And so they would have to be.

In offering the hypothesis that Collingwood's anti-Kantianism was, in part, the unconscious expression of his allegiance to the formal categories - if not to the content - of Christian orthodoxy, I am suggesting that he was trapped in a dilemma essentially of his own making. Having convinced himself that it was neither fruitful nor possible to look beyond his own inherited religious tradition, he deprived himself of the very insights he might have used in order to transform that tradition in accordance with his own fundamental principles of rational autonomy: tolerance and critical inquiry. This was the transformation he had envisioned in 1919. Yet, no sooner had he imagined this possibility than he dissipated its promise by retreating into a crabby parochialism. On the other hand, if my analysis is correct, this was far from an inevitable end.
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

I. Books:

II. Published Articles and Lectures:
FN 'Fascism and Nazism.' Philosophy, XV (1940), 168-176.

III. Unpublished writings (On file, Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford University):
PCR 'The Philosophy of the Christian Religion' (1920).
LMP 'Lectures on Moral Philosophy' (1933).
MGM 'Man Goes Mad' (1936).
RIn 'Religious Intolerance' (n.d.).

FELSER NOTES

1 An earlier version of this paper (under a different title) was presented at a symposium at the March 1994 meeting of the American Academy of Religion/Mid-Atlantic Region. Both papers had their genesis in my thesis, 'R. G. Collingwood's Early Philosophy of Religion and its Development,' Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago 1992. For the present work, I am exceedingly indebted to James Connelly and David Boucher for their criticism and editorial suggestions.
8 David Bohm and F. D. Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity (New York, Bantam, 1987), 265. Also, Bohm's distinction between 'dialogue' and 'discussion' in Wholeness (240-47) is almost identical to Collingwood's account of Plato's distinction between 'dialectic' and 'critique.'
10 Coomaraswamy, 'Sri Ramakrishna and Religious Tolerance.'
14 Charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1940). Cochrane, a friend of Collingwood's, also had his historical training at Oxford. He acknowledges a debt to Collingwood in the preface (p. vii). The late Alan Donagan once told me in conversation that Collingwood's contribution to the work was actually quite extensive. How he knew this I do not know - I didn't think to ask him at the time - but I do not believe he would have said it unless he knew it to be so.
15 Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, 254-55.
16 Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, 206.
18 Jung is actually mentioned only once - in a footnote - in a disparaging fashion (PA, 127n.).
19 Campbell, Occidental Mythology, 405.
23 In personal correspondence with the present author (August 29, 1994). I originally thought that the fragment belonged to Collingwood's later period; but Connelly pointed out that the lecture on pain which Collingwood says he substituted for the one on intolerance was delivered by him on March 2, 1919.
24 Parliament passed the Toleration Act in 1689.
25 MacIntyre, 'The Fate of Theism', 15.
27 Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, 204-206.
Feller

28 Coomaraswamy, 'Sri Ramakrishna and Religious Tolerance', 35.
29 Meister Eckhart, 'Sermon, Distinctions are Lost in God', in Meister Eckhart, A Modern Translation, ed. and trans. by R. B. Blakney (New York, Harper and Row, 1941), 204.
33 See Thich Nhat Hanh, Being Peace (Berkeley, California, Parallax Press, 1987), 89.
38 Blofeld, The Tantric Mysticism of Tibet, 114.
42 Coomaraswamy, 'Sri Ramakrishna and Religious Intolerance', 36-37.
50 Kaufmann, Critique of Religion, 188-189.
52 Martin Luther, 'The Bondage of the Will', in Martin Luther, Selections From His Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (New York, Anchor, 1961), 174.
53 Luther, 'The Bondage of the Will', 171.
72